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系統編號:

091SCU00121020

出版年:

2003

研究生:

林明寬

研究生(英文姓名):

Ming-Kuan Lin

論文名稱:

網路拍賣市場之延遲競標與網路外部性研究

英文論文名稱:

Late Bidding and Network Externalities on Internet Auction

指導教授:

尚榮安

指導教授(英文姓名):

Rong-An Shang

學位類別:

碩士

校院名稱:

東吳大學　

系所名稱:

企業管理學系

學號:

90353012

學年度:

語文別:

英文

論文頁數:

關鍵詞:

網路拍賣 ; 延遲競標 ; 網路外部性

英文關鍵詞:

Internet Auction ; Late Bidding ; Network Externalities

被引用次數:

[ 摘要 ]

拍賣自有史以來，已有數千年歷史。這種交易模式的出現，不僅緩和了標價市場（posted market）的價格僵固，也疏通了初級商品與次級商品的流動。數千年來，拍賣的制度雖不斷地改善，但仍舊無法突破地理上的空間限制，並且對於有效價格（effective price）的達成，也沒有必然的把握。時至今日，網際網路漸趨普及，傳統的拍賣模式也在十多年前，開始由實體轉向虛擬，因而形成了網路拍賣這種新的交易模式。這項創新使得拍賣能夠跨越時空，因此解決了匯聚人潮的地理問題，但另一方面，有效價格的問題卻日益嚴重。有效價格無法達成的主要因素是制度的設計、競標者的行為、與競標的情境。
英式拍賣（English auction）是目前最廣為應用的拍賣制度，所以我們會將研究範圍限定在英式拍賣。我們會藉由探討延遲競標（late bidding）與網路外部性（network externalities）兩個現象，從而理解競標者的行為。在拍賣的過程當中，有些競標者通常會隱藏投標意願，並且搶在拍賣結束前才競標或放冷槍（sniping），以壓低競標次數來獲得較低的結標價格（ending price），當這類的投機競標者越多，實際的結標價格與最適的有效價格差距就越大，這種現象我們稱之為延遲競標。此外，拍賣市場也存在另一種現象，有些競標者會提前出價，並且受其他競標者的影響而持續出價，此即正向回饋（positive feedback）的網路外部性。我們會試著找出這兩種現象的成因與後果，以及兩種現象同時存在時的可能影響。值得注意的是，這些問題可能與競標者的類別與拍賣的情境有關，所以我們會再深入探討競標者在不同情境下的行為是否有異。另外，我們也會探討是否有其他因素對結標價格造成影響，例如總競投次數或總競投人數。
本篇研究以拍賣網站Go2HK為取樣對象。該網站將會員分成VIP會員與一般會員，並且每週舉辦兩次”筍貨拍賣”（POSA; Product-On Sale-Auction）。這種類型的拍賣針對會員的入場資格又再分為兩類拍賣，於是我們得以觀察競標者在不同拍賣情境中之行為。我們的研究結果指出：延遲競標主要是由競標者間的默契所造成；網路外部性的成因與情感因素有關；延遲競標可能受網路外部性的影響而和緩或加劇，需看前期的競標熱絡程度而定；競標者在不同的拍賣情境中會有不同的競標行為。最後，尚有其他研究結果與義涵也列在本篇論文當中。

[ 英文摘要 ]

Auctions have been a one of exchange models for thousands of years. The issues derived from it become more and more important, especially for these ten years when the idea of auctions brings to Internet. Internet auctions can solve some transactional problems that traditional ones cannot solve effectively as yet, for instance gathering a large number of bidders and sellers. But they still receive and carry on some transactional problems from traditional auctions, for example deciding the effective prices. The main factors of affecting prices are mechanisms that designers designed, bidder’s behaviors, and bidding situations.
Our study will limit the mechanism on the English auction which is the prevalent one. We will comprehend the bidders’ behaviors by discussing two interesting phenomena, late bidding and network externalities in the auctions. The late bidding means that most bidders hold their bids and then submit at the latest few minutes. In addition to the late bidding, there is also a phenomenon which is called the network externalities. The network externalities with positive feedback refer to the idea of “more and more” or “less and less”. We want to know what factors the two phenomena result from and what effects the two phenomena result in. In particular, when these two problems occur in the auctions at the same time, what influences will be produced? Note that these problems may be related to the types of bidders or auctions. Therefore, we are wondering whether bidding behaviors are different in diverse auction situations. It is also an interesting issue to examine whether the number of bids or bidders can affect bidding results or not.
The transaction records collected by Go2HK website are to help us comprehend and analyze. The site has categorized members into two kinds and provides a special service, POSA, which is divided into two kinds of auctions. We then can observe bidders’ behaviors in diverse situations. The results of our analyses are as below. First, the late bidding results from an unspoken consensus and results in relatively low prices. Secondly, the network externalities result from emotional factors. In addition, the late bidding will mitigate or deteriorate with the positive network externalities. It depends on how active the bidding is in the early stage. Thirdly, the bidder actually has different behaviors in diverse situations. Fourthly, the ending price is not related to the number of bids or bidders. Other results and implications will be discussed in this thesis.

[ 論文目次 ]

1 Introduction.………………………………………………………1
1.1 Motivations………………………………………………………1
1.1.1 Mechanisms………………………………………….…………2
1.1.2 Behaviors………………………………………………………4
1.2 Objectives…………………………………………………….…6
2 Literature Review…….….………………………………………7
2.1 Auctions……………………………………………………….…7
2.1.1 History…………………………………………………………7
2.1.2 Auctions versus Posted Price Selling…………….……8
2.1.3 Auctions Mechanisms………………………………….……10
2.2 Internet Auctions…………………………………………….12
2.2.1 Auction Rules……………………………………………….13
2.3 Special Issues on the Internet Auctions……………….18
2.3.1 Bidder Behavior…………………………………………….18
2.3.2 Bidder Classification…………………………………….22
3 Research Contexts….………………..……………………..…26
4 Study 1: Static Analysis……….…………………………...31
4.1 Research Problem………………………………………………31
4.2 Situations versus Bidding Types………………………….35
4.3 Ratio of Area versus Ratio of Spread……………………36
5 Study 2: Dynamic Analysis…….………………………………43
5.1 Research Problem………………………………………………43
5.2 Multiple Regression………………………………………….48
5.3 Two-Way ANCOVA…………………………………………………54
6 Conclusions…….…………………………………………………60
6.1 Summary of the Results………………………………………60
6.2 Implications……………………………………………………61
6.3 Limitations & Future Studies………………………………64
Appendix….……………………………………………….…………66
References..…………………………………………………………67

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